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LABOR LAW-FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION-SCOPE OF ARGUABLE NLRB JURIS-
DICTION-Picketing by petitioner interrupted the unloading of respondent's 
cargo vessels. A state court granted respondent's request for a permanent 
injunction against further picketing, despite petitioner's contention that, 
since it was a "labor organization" within the meaning of section S(b) of 
the Labor Management Relations Act1 and respondent had alleged an un-
fair labor practice,2 the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive 
jurisdiction of the dispute. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the 
granting of injunctive relief.3 On certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court, held, reversed, one Justice dissenting.4 Since an unfair labor practice 
has been alleged and petitioner is arguably a labor organization, state and 
federal courts must yield to the primary authority of the NLRB to deter-
mine whether it has jurisdiction of the controversy. Marine Enr;rs Beneficial 
Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962). 
Because Congress intended the NLRB to be a centralized agency to 
provide uniform regulation of labor relations,5 state and federal courts are 
generally precluded from adjudicating controversies within the statutory 
scope of the Board.6 In order to prevent conflict between state action and 
federal labor regulation, the NLRB has been endowed with primary author-
ity to determine whether a given controversy is within its domain.7 In 
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,8 the Supreme Court held that 
where an activity is "arguably" within the competence of the Board, state 
and federal courts must yield to the authority of the NLRB to determine 
whether a controversy involving that activity is within the Board's domain. 
National uniformity, however, is not always the primary goal in labor 
relations, for there are important exceptions to the usual rule of exclusive 
1 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1958). See also Labor Manage• 
ment Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 2(3), (5), (11), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 152(3), (5), (11) (1958). 
2 See Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b)(4)(A), 61 Stat. 140 
(1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (Supp. III, 1961). 
3 Interlake S.S. Co. v. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 260 Minn. 1, 108 N.W.2d 627 
(1961). 
4 Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that petitioner was not even arguably 
entitled to the protection of the NLRA since it had presented no evidence that any 
persons other than supervisors were within its membership. 
5 See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953). 
6 Id. at 491. 
7 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959), 58 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 288. 
8 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
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NLRB jurisdiction.9 For example, state courts may act in situations of 
peculiarly local concern, such as violence and mass picketing, despite con-
current NLRB jurisdiction.1° Furthermore, many labor controversies are 
entirely outside the Board's authority simply because of the statutory 
limitations of the National Labor Relations Act and its amendments. A 
controversy concerning an employer whose business is primarily intrastate, 
for example, is not within the Board's domain.11 The judicial remedies now 
available in the areas totally outside the Board's competence, as well as in 
the areas excepted from exclusive NLRB jurisdiction, are of vital im-
portance. The Garmon decision, however, presented a danger that local 
court jurisdiction of such controversies might be severely restricted. The 
principal case, and others similar to it, have emphasized this problem by 
demonstrating that the Garmon test of "arguable" jurisdiction applies not 
only to the question of whether an alleged activity is an unfair labor prac-
tice, but to all the boundaries which delimit NLRB jurisdiction.12 Yet 
many of the limits defining NLRB jurisdiction are highly indefinite; few 
can be applied with substantial certainty. If the "arguable" test is applied 
to each of these boundaries and interpreted so as to foreclose state or federal 
court jurisdiction upon a showing of the merest possibility of NLRB jurisdic-
tion, the result could well be a drastic contraction of the areas not pres-
ently subject to exclusive NLRB jurisdiction, at least so far as the avail-
ability of prompt local action is concerned. It must be remembered that in 
many labor disputes timing is of the essence, and that denial of an injunc• 
tion or other prompt remedy often guarantees the success of a strike, 
whether that denial is a product of a hearing on the merits, or merely based 
on a tenuous contention of arguable pre-emption by the NLRB.13 A later 
NLRB finding of no jurisdiction may be of little comfort. 
Initial interpretation of Garmon posed just such a danger to the con-
tinued meaningful existence of the exceptions to and limitations on ex-
clusive NLRB jurisdiction, for some courts denied jurisdiction on the basis 
of highly dubious suggestions of NLRB jurisdiction.14 The principal case, 
o The importance of assuring judicial remedies within these exceptions was emphasized 
by congressional action designed to fill the former "no-man's-land" created by the 
jurisdictional yardsticks of the NLRB. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 70l(a), 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (Supp. III, 1961). 
10 See, e.g., UAW v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956). 
11 Labor Management Relations Act §§ 2(6), (7), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 152(6), (7) (1958). 
12 See, e.g., State ex rel. Yellow Cab Serv., Inc. v. Superior Court, 53 Wash. 2d 644, 
333 P.2d 924 (1959), rev'd per curiam, 361 U.S. 373 (1960); Incres S.S. Co. v. International 
Maritime Workers, 10 N.Y.2d 218, 176 N.E.2d 719, 219 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1961), rev'd on other 
grounds, 83 Sup. Ct. 611 (1963). 
13 See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor 
Relations, 59 CoLuM. L. REv. 6, 32, 269 (1959). 
14 See, e.g., International Chem. Workers v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 202 F. 
Supp. 363 (S.D. Ill. 1962); Wax v. International Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173, 161 A.2d 
603 (1960). But see Amalgamated Ass'n of Ry. Employees v. Las Vegas-Tonopah•Reno 
Stage Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 726 (D. Nev. 1962). 
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the first one since Garmon in which the Supreme Court has considered the 
"arguable" test at length, should serve to prevent such an emasculation of 
the exceptions to exclusive NLRB jurisdiction, for it suggests that the 
Garmon test does not dictate pre-emption unless there is at least a reason-
able basis for such a finding. The Court's choice of the principal case for 
amplification of the "arguable" test was itself significant, for the jurisdic-
tional question at issue involved one of the least precise and most trouble-
some distinctions which delimit NLRB jurisdiction-whether the peti-
tioner (defendant below) was a "labor organization" within the meaning 
of the act.15 While complexity alone would probably not have been sufficient 
to assure pre-emption, the defendant presented substantial and convincing 
evidence in the trial court of its status as a labor organization. The Court 
relied heavily upon this evidence, which consisted primarily of recent 
NLRB determinations that petitioner was, at least for some purposes, a 
labor organization.16 The result was a dear showing of highly probable 
NLRB jurisdiction. 
The principal case, along with other recent court decisions applying 
the Garmon rule, has hopefully now delineated with somewhat greater 
certainty the tests to be applied by the courts where pre-emption is claimed. 
In some instances the pleadings alone may be a sufficient basis for denial 
of jurisdiction by the trial court. This may occur where the plaintiff's com-
plaint alleges the elements necessary to NLRB jurisdiction without claim-
ing an exception thereto, and the defendant demurs on jurisdictional 
grounds.17 Where probable NLRB jurisdiction does not appear on the 
face of the plaintiff's complaint, it is unlikely that the defendant can ob-
tain dismissal on the pleadings alone. To secure a dismissal the defendant 
must then present evidence of arguable NLRB jurisdiction.18 A mere con-
tention to that effect will not suffice,19 and most courts have required the 
presentation of relevant NLRB or court decisions demonstrating the 
competence of the NLRB to determine the issue.20 Upon such a showing 
by the defendant the plaintiff's task becomes very difficult; only by pres-
entation of highly convincing authority to the contrary can he avoid dis-
missal.21 The principal case suggests that the defendant be given a sub-
stantial advantage in this situation, for it indicates that even where the 
15 See, e.g., NLRB v. Swift &: Co., 292 F.2d 561 (1st Cir. 1961). 
16 Principal case at 183. 
17 See, e.g., Hobbs-Parsons Co. v. Teamsters Union, 195 Cal. App. 2d 533, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1961). 
18 See, e.g., Wood, Wire &: Metal Lathers Union v. Babcock Co., 132 So. 2d 16 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1961); cf. In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962). 
19 See, e.g., Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd., 52 Cal. 2d 568, 343 P.2d 
23 (1959); Ex parte George, 358 S.W .2d 590 (f ex. 1962). 
20 See, e.g., Wax v. International Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173, 161 A.2d 603 (1960). 
21 See, e.g., Bogle v. Jakes Foundry Co., 362 U.S. 401 (1960), reversing per curiam 
49 Tenn. App. 309, 329 S.W.2d 364 (Ct. App. 1959); Superior Court v. Washington ex rel. 
Yellow Cab Serv., Inc., 361 U.S. 373 (1960), reversing per curiam 53 Wash. 2d 644, 333 
P.2d 924 (1959); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959); 
Gallogly v. Bakery Workers, 180 F. Supp. 778 (D.R.!. 1960). 
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plaintiff's jurisdictional contentions seem eminently well-reasoned, the 
defendant's presentation of reasonably relevant NLRB or court authority 
requires dismissal.22 Prudent plaintiffs will avoid this eventuality by insert-
ing in the complaint, where possible, specific allegations negating exclusive 
NLRB jurisdiction, e.g., that the business is not in interstate commerce, 
or that the union involved is not a labor organization.23 This tactic will 
usually cast a heavy burden on a defendant claiming pre-emption.24 How-
ever, while advantageous to the plaintiff, such an approach can easily en-
danger judicial efficiency, for determination of the jurisdictional issue is 
likely to become a virtual trial on the merits.25 This danger is especially 
prevalent where the plaintiff seeks to avoid immediate pre-emption by 
alleging that the controversy involves sufficient violence to allow the state 
to grant relief under its police power.26 At this point the solution can 
lie only in the discretion of the trial court. While judicial efficiency and 
the avoidance of federal-state conflict are vital objectives, the trial court 
should also recognize the injustice of denying an immediate judicial remedy 
merely because the defendant raises a tenuous claim of "arguable" pre-
emption. 
Martin B. Dickimon, Jr., S.Ed. 
22 Principal case at 184. 
23 See, e.g., Freight Drivers Union v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 180 
(D. Mass. 1961). 
24 See, e.g., Cox v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 855, 346 P.2d 15 (1959). 
211 See, e.g., Portland Web Pressmen's Union v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 188 F. Supp 
859 (D. Ore.), aff d, 286 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 866 U.S. 912 (1961); Wilson 
&: Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 181 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa 1960). 
26 The jurisdictional issue as to whether such violence has occurred ordinarily in-
volves the same factual determination upon which the plaintiff bases his substantive 
claim. See Michelman, State Power To Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 IIARv. 
L. REv. 641, 664 (1961). 
